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EVADING MIRANDA:  HOW SEIBERT AND 
PATANE FAILED TO “SAVE” MIRANDA† 
Sandra Guerra Thompson∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona1 announced a remedy to 
counteract the effects of psychological tactics during custodial 
interrogations that can create a coercive atmosphere and overwhelm 
suspects of limited education or experience.2  The Court proscribed a set 
of “warnings” that should be issued in order to dispel the coercion in the 
interrogation room.  The warnings would give the suspect the 
information needed to make a “free choice” in deciding whether or not 
to speak to the police.3  Forty years after the pronouncement of these 
goals—to dispel coercion and empower suspects to make better choices 
for themselves during interrogations—we can now clearly see that the 
Miranda experiment has been a “spectacular failure.”4  
                         
† In 1998, Professor Charles D. Weisselberg made an eloquent plea for the Supreme 
Court to “save” Miranda by returning to the “original vision” of Miranda and “excluding 
from evidence, for all purposes, statements . . . taken in violation of Miranda.” See Charles 
D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 112 (1998).  Some scholars 
continue today to call on the Court to improve the way in which the Miranda rule operates 
in the interrogation room.  See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in 
Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).  This 
Article takes the view that Seibert and Patane greatly diminish, if not extinguish, any hope 
that the Court will transform Miranda into an effective tool for curbing unduly coercive 
interrogation practices. 
∗  UH Law Foundation Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Institute, 
University of Houston Law Center.  The author wishes to thank Alfredo Garcia, 
Christopher Slobogin, and George C. Thomas, III, for their insightful comments on an 
earlier draft of this Article.  The author also owes a debt of gratitude to Mon Yin Lung, 
Associate Director of the O’Quinn Law Library of the UH Law Center for her outstanding 
research assistance.  She also gratefully acknowledges the UH Law Foundation for its 
generous support. 
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 Id. at 445–56. 
3 See George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:  
“Embedded” in Our National Culture? in CRIME AND JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 203 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2002). 
4 See George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion:  Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation 
Room Miranda’s Waning Protections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092, 1094 n.16 (2003) (listing 
citations of other authors with similar views); see also Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to 
Disregard Miranda, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (2002) (stating that “the future of the Miranda 
rules is both uncertain and bleak” because Miranda’s mild exclusionary sanction will lead 
to increased noncompliance); Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
309, 309 (2003) (stating that “Miranda v. Arizona is a hoax” in that it has had little effect on 
police behavior and may even cover for improper conduct). 
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Two cases decided last term—Missouri v. Seibert5 and United States v. 
Patane6—bear on a growing practice of “going outside” Miranda, 
meaning intentionally violating Miranda in a number of different ways 
that can yield admissible statements or other evidence. 7  Ordinarily, if 
the police violate the rule in Miranda, statements directly obtained by 
that violation are inadmissible in the government’s case in chief.  
However, the Supreme Court has created many exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule.  These exceptions create incentives for the police 
intentionally to violate Miranda when the benefits are considered to 
outweigh the costs.8   
Seibert involved one variant of the practice of intentionally violating 
Miranda, what is commonly dubbed “going outside” Miranda.  In Seibert, 
the police used the “question-first” tactic in which an investigating 
officer interrogates a suspect without giving Miranda warnings and 
obtains incriminating statements, and then issues the warnings to obtain 
a second, and presumably admissible, version of the statement.  The 
Court essentially teaches the police how to violate Miranda intentionally 
and then “cure” the violation so as to render the incriminating 
statements admissible.  
The Patane case, on the other hand, allowed the Court to reconsider 
the admissibility of physical evidence discovered as a result of 
statements taken in violation of Miranda.  In Patane, the Court simply 
turns a blind eye to the fact that exceptions to Miranda encourage 
intentional violations.  The Court approves the use of physical evidence 
found as a direct result of Miranda violations.  Wisconsin v. Knapp,9 a case 
following Patane, makes clear that physical evidence discovered as a 
result of a Miranda violation is fully admissible even when the violation 
                         
5 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
6 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
7 Throughout this Article, I refer to “violations of Miranda” as a shorthand way to say 
that the police did not follow the warnings and waiver procedures set out in the Miranda 
decision, not to indicate that a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights have been violated.  There 
is considerable disagreement among scholars, and among members of the Supreme Court, 
as to whether the Fifth Amendment applies in the interrogation room or whether the 
suspect’s constitutional rights are not violated until the point that a court admits evidence 
taken “in violation” of Miranda at trial.  See generally Clymer, supra note 4 (arguing that 
Miranda does not impose a constitutional duty on the police to issue warnings prior to 
custodial interrogation).  This Article takes no position on this issue. 
8  For a discussion of the practice of deliberately violating Miranda to gain other 
evidentiary advantages, see infra notes 154–59. 
9  542 U.S. 952 (2004) (following Patane and vacating the lower court decision to exclude 
physical evidence obtained as a direct result of a Miranda violation that was an intentional 
attempt to prevent the suspect from exercising his Fifth Amendment rights). 
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is an intentional attempt to undermine a suspect’s Fifth Amendment 
rights in order to discover the evidence. 
With the Seibert and Patane decisions, the Court has reaffirmed the 
extremely limited usefulness of Miranda as a tool for protecting suspects 
from coercive police tactics.  Seibert and Patane represent the coup de 
grace for the demise of Miranda.  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
interpreting Miranda, viewed in its entirety, consists of a long series of 
decisions that have gradually chipped away the protection the Miranda 
warnings were intended to provide and has encouraged deliberate 
attempts to circumvent the warnings requirement.10  For example, the 
Court’s ruling allowing the government to use a person’s post-arrest, 
pre-warning silence as evidence of guilt creates an incentive to 
deliberately delay issuing warnings.11  If an arrested person remains 
silent, that silence can be used to impeach the person’s exculpatory 
testimony at trial.  If the person volunteers statements upon arrest, those 
statements may also be used because Miranda does not apply to 
statements that are not the product of “interrogation.”12  
Moreover, all the rules pertaining to the sufficiency of warnings, 
waiver, and invocation of rights tend to encourage the police to 
interrogate even when they may know that the suspect does not 
understand the rights, may not intend to waive them, or may be trying to 
assert them. The case law excuses police errors, readily finds suspects to 
have “voluntarily waived” their rights in cases that test credulity, and 
demands lawyer-like clarity in order for suspects to invoke their rights.13  
Then, too, even if a suspect does clearly invoke the right to silence, the 
Court allows the police to try again later to get the suspect to give up his 
or her rights.14  Only when a suspect clearly invokes the right to counsel, 
protected by the Sixth Amendment, and not simply Miranda, has the 
                         
10  In the Court’s own words, “[following Miranda], subsequent cases have reduced the 
impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement.”  Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000). 
11  See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).  A person’s pre-arrest silence may also be 
used.  See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).  The only limitation the Court has 
recognized is the use of pretrial silence after arrest and the delivery of Miranda warnings.  
See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
12 See infra notes 56–65 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 66–115 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
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Court provided more solicitous treatment, but few suspects demand a 
lawyer with the clarity required by the Court.15 
If, even with those advantages working it their favor, the police are 
still found to have violated a suspect’s Miranda rights, the Court has 
never applied a stringent exclusionary rule as a remedy.  Just six years 
after announcing the decision, the Supreme Court held that Miranda’s 
exclusionary rule does not apply to the “fruits,” evidence derived from 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda.16  The Court also has 
allowed the use of such statements for purposes other than to prove the 
government’s case in chief, such as impeachment.17  In other words, 
statements obtained by means of Miranda violations are freely admissible 
except for use in the government’s case in chief.  In addition, Patane now 
broadens the long-standing rule that physical evidence derived from 
Miranda violations is freely admissible even as part of the government’s 
case in chief, clarifying that even intentional violations may yield 
admissible fruits.18  The Court also recognized an exception for Miranda 
violations, presumably including intentional violations, that are 
necessary to protect public safety.19  No one is likely to dispute the 
necessity of violating Miranda under such circumstances, and since the 
suspect likely created the danger to public safety that necessitates 
immediate interrogation, this may be the one instance in which an 
intentional violation of Miranda is rightly allowed. 
Not surprisingly, the police increasingly ignore Miranda.  This is not 
to say that they do not issue the warnings—they do.  In the vast majority 
of cases, police issue Miranda warnings as required so as to make the 
resulting statements admissible as evidence in the prosecution’s case in 
chief20 and obtain waivers before proceeding to interrogate a suspect.21  
The warnings and waiver process is so easily manipulated that some 
observers have concluded that the police have “adapted” to Miranda and 
                         
15 If the right to counsel is invoked, police may not try again to get a waiver unless the 
suspect first re-initiates a generalized discussion of the investigation.  See infra notes 98–103 
and accompanying text. 
16 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451–52 (1974) (upholding admission of testimony of 
a witness discovered solely by means of statements obtained in good faith violation of 
Miranda). 
17 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
18  See 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
19 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984). 
20 George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1975 (2004) 
(finding compliance with the Miranda doctrine to be ninety-five percent and citing other 
similar findings). 
21 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 3, at 247 (stating that seventy-eight to ninety-six percent 
of suspects are issued warnings and waive their rights). 
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now use it as just another psychological tool to extricate confessions from 
suspects.22  The very fact that a person has given a waiver also bolsters 
the case that subsequent statements were voluntarily given.23 
In other cases, suspects refuse to waive their rights and instead 
invoke their rights to silence and/or counsel.  In these cases, observers 
have found a fairly high rate of Miranda violations by police officers who 
simply ignore the invocation of rights and continue the interrogation.  
Indeed, in some jurisdictions police were—and perhaps continue to be—
trained to “go outside” Miranda.24 
Thus, Miranda now serves police interests in one of two ways.  First, 
in cases in which police obtain waivers, it insulates a stressful 
interrogation process from judicial scrutiny to determine whether the 
confession was voluntarily given.25  Second, in cases in which the rights 
are invoked, the police may be able to ignore Miranda, perhaps 
deliberately, and elicit statements for impeachment use as well as 
uncovering other admissible derivative evidence.26  Interrogations in 
which police officers deliberately ignore invocations of Miranda’s 
protections can greatly affect the “voluntariness” of a confession as well.  
Yet, the due process voluntariness test continues to prove as ineffectual 
today in curbing the psychologically coercive practices of custodial 
interrogation as it was perceived to be by the Supreme Court when 
Miranda was decided.27  These concerns have led at least one 
                         
22 See generally Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda:  Modern 
Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397 
(1999) (urging that police have “adapted” to Miranda in order to use the requirements to 
their advantage). 
23 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (“[G]iving the warnings and getting 
a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility . . . .”); see also Thomas, 
supra note 4, at 1977 (stating that in seventy-five percent of cases involving waivers, 
voluntariness is not ever challenged, and in those cases challenging voluntariness of waiver 
or of answers given after waiver, government prevails in ninety-six percent of cases); 
Thomas & Leo, supra note 3, at 253. 
24 See infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text. 
25 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608–09 (2004). 
26 See infra notes 116–18, 129–37 and accompanying text. 
27 The Miranda decision is viewed as the Supreme Court’s attempt to provide greater 
protection for suspects’ rights than the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process voluntariness 
test.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455–56 (1966) (noting that incommunicado 
interrogation of individuals in a “police-dominated atmosphere” and the use of tactics that 
“trade[] on the weakness of individuals” might not be involuntary under the traditional 
due process test). One measure of the effectiveness of the voluntariness test in ferreting out 
confessions given under unduly coercive circumstances is the rate of innocent people who 
confess falsely.  See generally WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS:  POLICE 
INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 139–89 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2001) 
(addressing the scope of the problem of police-induced false confessions and giving 
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commentator to conclude that Miranda could do more harm than good if 
deliberate violations of the rule become more pervasive.28 
Seibert and Patane presented the perfect opportunities for the Court 
to put a stop to deliberate violations of Miranda, but the decisions do 
exactly the opposite.  Thus, this Article concludes that the time has come 
for scholars likewise to ignore Miranda and focus instead on other 
protections against coercive interrogation tactics.  Miranda was originally 
intended to provide a bright line rule that would protect suspects from 
coercive tactics that are inconsistent with the right against self-
incrimination.  It has failed to provide this protection, so the time has 
come to begin the search for alternative remedies. 
Part II of this Article demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s 
Miranda jurisprudence has gradually eroded the rule by creating 
incentives to interrogate even when the police may be aware that a 
suspect has not received or understood the warnings or when it is 
apparent that the suspect does not mean to waive his or her rights.  Part 
III reviews the recent decisions in Seibert and Patane, both of which may 
encourage rather than curtail the growing practice of intentionally 
violating Miranda.  The Article concludes with a plea for scholars and 
policy makers to look beyond Miranda and embrace new, bright line 
rules for custodial interrogations. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING THE CHOICE:  WHY POLICE FOLLOW OR IGNORE 
MIRANDA 
Miranda represents the Supreme Court’s effort to provide affirmative 
protection to criminal suspects who may face grueling and 
psychologically manipulative interrogations while in police custody.  Of 
course, constitutional law prohibits coerced, or involuntary, confessions, 
                                                       
examples); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, Coerced Confessions:  The Decision to Confess 
Falsely:  Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 983 (1997) (citing 
misuse of standard interrogation techniques as a major cause of false confessions); 
Innocence Project, False Confessions,  www.innocenceproject.org/causes/falseconfessions. 
php (last visited Mar. 12, 2006); see also Rob Warden, The Role of False Confessions in Illinois 
Wrongful Murder Convictions Since 1970 (2003), available at www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
depts/clinic/wrongful/False/Confessions2.htm.  But cf. Slobogin, supra note 4, at 313 
(noting that research provides insights on types of tactics most likely to induce false 
confessions). 
28 See Weisselberg, supra note †, at 162 (“If [deliberate violations of Miranda] ever 
pervade[] our system, we inevitably will realize that half a Miranda rule is worse by far 
than no rule at all.”). 
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such as those obtained through physical violence.29  However, the 
Supreme Court has never prohibited all practices that create 
psychological or physical pressures to confess.  How could it?  Is 
continual questioning for eight hours so long that a suspect will be 
“compelled” to confess?  Twelve hours?  Fifteen hours?  It may be 
impossible to say how long is too long because suspects’ breaking points 
will vary according to the psychological or physical fortitude of the 
individual suspect.  Similar questions are raised by other aspects of 
interrogations.  How much food must be provided?  How much sleep 
should a person be allowed?  And so forth.  Thus, it is especially 
problematic for a court to lay down bright line rules about any particular 
police practice as a matter of constitutional interpretation.30  Except for 
practices such as the use or threatened use of violence, the Court has 
declined to provide much specific guidance on how the police should 
conduct interrogations.  
Instead, the Court created what was originally perceived as a bright 
line rule in Miranda, requiring that suspects get information about their 
rights so that they can make the best decisions about whether or not to 
submit to questioning.  Miranda’s goals might be summarized as follows:  
to dispel the coercive environment of the interrogation room by arming 
suspects with knowledge of their rights to silence and the assistance of 
counsel, and then empowering suspects to determine whether to waive 
or invoke those rights.31  Achieving the original goals of dispelling the 
coercive atmosphere of the interrogation room through warnings and 
waiver—with the benefit of forty years of hindsight—seems to have been 
doomed to failure from the start. 
For one thing, the Miranda Court did not even endeavor to fully and 
effectively protect a suspect’s right to remain silent in the face of 
government questioning.  We might imagine a suspect’s rights during 
custodial interrogation as falling somewhere along a spectrum that 
measures the extent to which those rights are protected, and which 
negatively correlates with the government’s likelihood of obtaining a 
                         
29 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (stating that convictions resting 
solely upon confessions extorted by means of brutality and violence violate due process). 
30 The Court has found that extreme deprivations of sleep or food, or extended periods 
of isolation, have produced involuntary confessions in violation of due process.  See, e.g., 
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (finding that two sandwiches during a forty-hour 
detention and interrogation produced an involuntary confession); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 
U.S. 191 (1957) (finding that isolation for more than a week also produced an involuntary 
confession); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (finding that an interrogation for 
thirty-six hours without allowing suspect to rest produced an involuntary confession). 
31 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58. 
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confession.  At one end of the spectrum is the complete deprivation of 
rights, such as the use of torture to obtain confessions.  Early in the 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court declared that confessions obtained 
by means of brutality and violence run afoul of the Due Process Clause 
by violating our basic notions of decency and morality32 and because 
they cannot be trusted as reliable evidence of guilt.33  Physical or mental 
torture is a sure means of obtaining a confession, but that confession may 
well be false.34   
At the other end of the spectrum is a system that would either ban 
interrogations altogether or automatically appoint an attorney to 
represent a suspect taken into custody prior to police questioning.  Either 
approach would fully and effectively protect a person’s right against 
self-incrimination.  Just prior to the issuance of the Miranda decision, 
some commentators opined that the Supreme Court seemed inclined to 
require that attorneys be provided to all suspects during custodial 
interrogations.35  Such a move was feared by the law enforcement 
establishment, who believed it would effectively eliminate interrogations 
and the ability to obtain confessions, not to mention other evidence 
discovered as a result of confessions.  The fear, of course, was based on a 
belief that any defense attorney would advise his or her client to invoke 
the Fifth Amendment right to silence and refuse to answer any 
questions.   
The Court did not go so far as to require the presence of counsel, 
apparently concluding that the Fifth Amendment did not require the 
government to take affirmative steps to ensure full and effective 
implementation of suspects’ rights.  The Court in Miranda opted for a 
compromise36 position instead, providing a remedy that falls between 
the two ends of the rights spectrum:  Suspects may not be tortured into 
confessing, but attorneys are not to be provided during interrogations.  
The rule requires only warnings and waiver.  Even the original “vision” 
of Miranda does nothing at all to curb the psychological and physical 
                         
32 Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. 
33 Id. (“And the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state authorities have 
contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence.”). 
34 Recent developments exonerating persons who have been wrongly convicted confirm 
that false confessions can be obtained from persons through a variety of means, including 
torture.  See Innocence Project, supra note 27 (providing synopses of cases of false 
confessions in which a wrongly-convicted person was eventually exonerated and in which 
an actual perpetrator was eventually apprehended). 
35 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 (noting the “wealth of scholarly material” addressing the 
Escobedo decision). 
36 See Clymer, supra note 4, at 483 n.154. 
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strain of interrogation strategies.37  Indeed, the same manipulative tactics 
that concerned the Miranda Court continue to be promoted in police 
training manuals,38 perhaps the clearest real-world evidence that 
Miranda has failed. 
As the following Parts outline, the Supreme Court’s Miranda case 
law, even before Seibert and Patane, had diminished any possibility that 
Miranda might play even a moderately effective role in reducing the 
coercive atmosphere in the interrogation room.  Instead, the Court’s 
decisions have had the perverse effect of permitting police interrogators 
to use Miranda to their advantage—and to the disadvantage of the 
suspects questioned.  The Court has encouraged the police to circumvent 
Miranda’s intended protections in three ways:  (1) by obtaining 
incriminating evidence either through a person’s statements or through 
his or her silence before the  issuance of warnings; (2) by proceeding as if 
the suspect comprehends the warnings when there is reason to believe 
the suspect does not; and (3) by interrogating a suspect when there is 
reason to believe the suspect does not mean to waive his or her rights 
and may even be trying to invoke them.   In addition, the Court has 
shielded law enforcement from civil liability for Miranda violations, 
including intentional violations. 
A. Obtaining Evidence Without Issuing Warnings 
1. Using Post-Arrest, Pre-Warning Silence 
One way in which the Court has encouraged the police to 
circumvent the intended purpose of Miranda is by creating an incentive 
to delay issuing the warnings in order to derive evidentiary benefits.  In 
Fletcher v. Weir,39 the Court allowed the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence to impeach a defendant’s credibility.  At the time the defendant, 
Weir, was arrested, he did not try to justify his actions as self-defense.  In 
his testimony at trial, however, he raised a self-defense claim.  The 
purpose of mentioning his silence was to cast doubt on his credibility, 
presumably because one would expect a person in that situation to 
protest his innocence at the time of arrest. 
                         
37 See Weisselberg, supra note †, at 184–87 (arguing that Miranda was intended as a 
constitutional rule that should provide a complete rule of exclusion for objectively bad faith 
violations). 
38 Indeed, the manual is now in its fourth edition. See FRED EDWARD INBAU ET AL., 
CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 498–518 (4th ed. 2004). 
39 455 U.S. 603 (1982). 
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The Court had previously rejected the use of a suspect’s post-arrest 
silence in a situation in which Miranda warnings had been issued in Doyle 
v. Ohio.40  The decision found that “[s]ilence in the wake of these 
warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these 
Miranda rights.”41  Thus, the Court concluded that it would be 
fundamentally unfair to impeach a person with his post-arrest, post-
Miranda silence because silence in these circumstances is “insolubly 
ambiguous.”42  On the other hand, the issue in Jenkins v. Anderson43 was 
whether the impeachment use of one’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda, silence 
violated either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.  In rejecting the 
defendant’s due process argument, the Court stated that “no 
governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before arrest,” 
but that his “failure to speak occurred before [he] was taken into custody 
and given Miranda warnings.”44  Thus, the Court, applying the reasoning 
of Doyle, held that such use of the defendant’s pre-arrest silence did not 
violate the Constitution.45   
The facts in Fletcher presented a closer question.  In Fletcher, the 
defendant had stabbed another man and then gone home.  The police 
arrived at his home and arrested him but did not read him his Miranda 
rights.46   Weir did not say anything to the police about the circumstances 
of the stabbing, but at trial he took the stand in his defense and claimed 
the killing was in self-defense.  The Sixth Circuit found that the use of 
the defendant’s post-arrest silence violated due process, rejecting the 
argument that the presence or absence of Miranda warnings should be 
determinative.  The appeals court stated:   
We think that an arrest, by itself, is governmental action 
which implicitly induces a defendant to remain silent. 
When one combines a suspect’s fears and anxieties upon 
arrest with widespread knowledge of one’s right to 
remain silent, the result is often just that—silence. Given 
these realities, we think it is fundamentally unfair to 
                         
40 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
41 Id. at 617. 
42 Id. 
43 447 U.S. 231 (1980). 
44 Id. at 240. 
45 The Court rejected the Fifth Amendment argument on the grounds that the 
government is only allowed to impeach the defendant after he chose to “cast aside his cloak 
of silence” by testifying and that impeachment “advances the truthfinding function of the 
criminal trial.”  Id. at 238. 
46 Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 603 (1982). 
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allow impeachment through the use of any post-arrest 
silence.47 
The court also noted that to allow post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to 
be used for impeachment would “discourage the reading of Miranda 
warnings.”48  There is no requirement that Miranda rights be read 
immediately upon taking a suspect into custody, although most police 
departments have adopted such a  policy.49  The Sixth Circuit expressed 
concern that the benefits of prompt issuance of warnings could be lost if 
police were given an incentive to delay the reading of rights.50   
The Supreme Court did not share the circuit court’s concerns about 
losing the benefits of prompt warnings by creating an incentive 
deliberately to delay warnings.  The Court ignored the lower court’s 
arguments, and those of every other court that had considered the issue, 
that the mere fact of arrest can induce fear and anxiety that is often 
sufficient to induce silence and that the right to remain silent is widely 
known, even if the police do not issue warnings.51  Instead, the Court 
found no due process violation in the impeachment use of Weir’s post-
arrest silence “[i]n the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances 
embodied in the Miranda warnings . . . .”52  
Delaying the issuance of warnings does not violate the terms of 
Miranda, as Miranda only requires that warnings be given prior to 
custodial interrogation.53  So long as police refrain from interrogating a 
suspect who is taken into custody, Miranda is not violated.  However, the 
Fletcher case means that the government always benefits from delaying 
the issuance of warnings.  If the arrestee volunteers statements, any 
incriminating statements are fully admissible.  If the arrestee remains 
silent, his or her silence can be used for impeachment should the person 
take the stand at trial.  The Miranda decision portrayed the custodial 
setting as inherently coercive and envisioned that the warnings would 
                         
47 Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1131 (6th Cir. 1981).  The appeals court also noted that 
every other decision to date was consistent with this position.  Id. 
48 Id. at 1132. 
49 Id. (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980), for the proposition that 
warnings are not required upon taking suspect into custody, but rather prior to 
interrogation). 
50 Fletcher, 658 F.2d at 1132. 
51 Id. at 1130–31. 
52 Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982). 
53 See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (“[T]he special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are 
required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in 
custody is subjected to interrogation.”). 
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dispel that coercive atmosphere.54  Fletcher encourages the practice of 
deliberately prolonging the coercion for as long as possible. 
2. Limiting the Need to Issue Warnings 
The Miranda rule requires the issuance of warnings for any person in 
“custody”55 prior to “interrogation.”  In Rhode Island v. Innis,56 the Court 
limited the reach of the Miranda rule by finding that police officers who 
had discussed a suspect’s case with each other while in the suspect’s 
presence were not “interrogating” the suspect.  In so finding, the Court 
encouraged the police to try to obtain statements from suspects without 
first issuing warnings by holding conversations with each other that 
might cause a suspect to speak. 
The facts involved a suspect, Innis, who was arrested for robbery, 
given the warnings, and immediately asserted his right to an attorney.57  
The officers proceeded to transport him to the police station and, during 
the course of a few minutes and less than a mile’s drive, the officers 
conversed amongst themselves, knowing that Innis could hear their 
conversation.58  The officers discussed the suspect’s missing shotgun, 
and they talked about how many handicapped children at a nearby 
school played in the area and that they should search for the gun for the 
children’s safety.  One officer then stated that it would be too bad if a 
little girl picked up the gun and accidentally killed herself.59  Innis then 
interrupted the conversation and offered to show them where the gun 
was located. 
The case presented the issue of the definition of “interrogation” for 
purposes of the Miranda rule.  The Court sensibly defined interrogation 
as “either express questioning or its functional equivalent” by which the 
Court meant “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect.”60  The definition also contemplates that if a practice is intended 
                         
54 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448–52 (1966). 
55 See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (“[T]he ultimate 
inquiry [in defining custody] is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (quoting Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam))). 
56 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
57 Id. at 294. 
58 Id. at 294–95. 
59 Id. at 295 (“He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little—I believe he said a 
girl—would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.”). 
60 Id. at 300–01. 
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to elicit a response, it will most likely also be one that they should have 
known was reasonably likely to elicit a response.61  
It is the application of this definition to the facts of the case that 
narrows the reach of the Miranda rule.  The Court found that the officers’ 
conversation amounted to “no more than a few offhand remarks” and 
that the officers had no reason to know that Innis would be “peculiarly 
susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of 
handicapped children.”62  Moreover, the Court concluded that the facts 
do not suggest that the officers’ comments were intended to elicit a 
response.63  Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, stating 
that he was “utterly at a loss” to see how the majority could have 
concluded that no interrogation took place.64  Justice Stevens’ dissenting 
opinion viewed the Court’s “stinted test” as “creat[ing] an incentive for 
police to ignore a suspect’s invocation of his rights in order to make 
continued attempts to extract information from him.”65 
B. Transforming Miranda From “Safeguards” for Suspects to an 
Interrogation Tool for Police—The Warning and Waiver Requirements  
If the Miranda rule is easy to apply and if it is easy to obtain a 
suspect’s waiver of his or her rights, then it is that much easier for the 
police to proceed with interrogation and obtain fully admissible 
statements.  Supreme Court decisions in these areas have indeed turned 
Miranda’s “safeguards”66 into a minor formality that is not likely to 
impede the path to interrogation and may in fact be a useful 
interrogation tool.   
The Court first signaled that it would not apply stringent rules 
regarding the issuance of warnings in its 1974 decision in Michigan v. 
Tucker.67  In dicta, the Court commented on how courts should view 
good faith errors in the issuance of warnings:  “Just as the law does not 
require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot 
realistically require that policeman investigating serious crimes make no 
                         
61 Id. at 308 n.7. 
62 Id. at 302–03. 
63 Id. at 303 n.9. 
64 Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at 312, 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
66 Early in the post-Miranda case law, the Court began referring to Miranda’s warnings 
and waiver procedure as “safeguards” rather than “requirements,” underscoring the view 
of the procedure as “prophylactic” and not in themselves constitutional rights.  See 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). 
67 Id. at 446. 
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errors whatsoever.”68  Thus, despite the fact that it would be a simple 
matter to expect police officers to read the warnings from a card so as to 
ensure accuracy, the Court instead chose to overlook sloppy recitations, 
even in situations in which the faulty warnings might mislead some 
suspects. 
The Court’s decision in California v. Prysock69 made clear that police 
officers could issue warnings in varying forms without violating 
Miranda.  The lower court had ruled that police should give the warnings 
using the precise language of the Miranda opinion,70 and it considered it 
Miranda’s greatest strength that its precise requirements were so easily 
met.71  The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that “[q]uite the contrary, 
Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to 
satisfy its strictures.”72   
This variation in language was challenged in Duckworth v. Eagan,73 in 
which the police informed the suspect that an attorney would be 
appointed for him “‘if and when you go to court.’”74  Reiterating that the 
warnings are not in themselves constitutional rights but prophylactic 
safeguards, the Court concluded that the issue was “simply whether the 
warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by 
Miranda.’”75  Interestingly, the Court in Prysock had approved the 
warnings in that case because they “fully conveyed” the Miranda rights,76 
but in Duckworth the standard adopted was whether the rights were 
“reasonably conveyed.”  Finding that the warnings given in the case 
accurately reflected the state procedure for appointment of counsel, i.e., 
“in court,” the majority concluded that the warnings did reasonably 
convey to the suspect his Miranda rights.77  
Writing for the four dissenting members of the Court in Duckworth, 
Justice Marshall argued that the “if and when you go to court” caveat 
would be misunderstood by most suspects who would likely conclude 
that no attorney would be provided until trial.78  Even worse, he believed 
                         
68 Id. 
69 453 U.S. 355 (1981). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 359. 
72 Id. 
73 492 U.S. 197 (1989). 
74 Id. at 197. 
75 Id. at 203 (alterations in original). 
76 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361. 
77 Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203–04. 
78 Id. at 217 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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that the average suspect would assume that he faced indefinite deferral 
of interrogation until such time as he might obtain the assistance of 
counsel “if and when” he goes to court.  Given the choice of trying to 
clear himself of suspicion immediately without the assistance of counsel 
or waiting until such time when counsel might be appointed, a suspect 
might choose to proceed without the assistance of counsel, a choice that 
the dissenters found to be fraught with coercion.79 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has eased the burden on the 
prosecution to prove that a suspect made a voluntary waiver and 
encourages police officers to begin questioning even in situations in 
which they may feel the suspect does not actually intend to waive his 
rights or may not have the capacity to understand his rights.  The 
suspect agreed to talk to FBI agents, refused to sign the waiver at the 
bottom of an “Advice of Rights” form, and did not explicitly waive his 
right to counsel in North Carolina v. Butler.80  Ignoring any possible 
significance of his refusal to sign the waiver form, the Court assumed 
that Butler had explicitly waived his right to silence by stating that he 
would talk to the agents.  The only issue then was whether he had also 
implicitly waived his right to counsel.  The Court concluded that “[a]n 
express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent 
or of the right to counsel is . . . not inevitably either necessary or 
sufficient to establish waiver.”81  “[S]ilence, coupled with an 
understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver” 
may be sufficient to prove waiver.82  While maintaining that the courts 
should presume that a suspect has not waived his rights and that “the 
prosecution’s burden is great,” the Court nonetheless concluded that “in 
                         
79 Id. at 217–18. 
80 441 U.S. 369, 370–71 (1979). 
81 Id. at 373.  The Court has found waivers in other situations in which the suspect’s 
conduct betrays an erroneous understanding of the warning that “anything you say can be 
used against you.”  Many suspects apparently believe that only written statements can be 
offered into evidence.  For example, in Connecticut v. Barrett, the suspect refused to make a 
written statement without the presence of counsel, but the suspect was willing to make an 
oral statement.  479 U.S. 523, 525–26 (1987).  The Court held that the suspect had invoked 
his right to counsel for the limited purpose of making a written statement, but that he had 
validly waived his rights for purposes of offering oral statements.  Id. at 529. 
 In Fare v. Michael C., the Court held that the government could satisfy its burden to 
prove a valid waiver if, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the waiver appears to 
have been validly given, and the Court determined that the totality of the circumstances 
test is adequate, even in a case involving a juvenile. 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). 
82 Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. 
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at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and 
words of the person interrogated.”83   
It is especially telling that the Court chose a case in which the 
suspect had not even graduated from high school, might not have been 
literate,84 and refused to sign the waiver form.  The record also suggests 
that he had not been read his rights just prior to questioning, although he 
had been advised of his rights sometime earlier upon arrest.  The facts of 
the case thus present a weak case for finding that the suspect understood 
his rights and clearly intended to waive them.  Yet the Supreme Court 
chose this case in which to rule that police can infer a valid waiver from 
a person’s words and conduct in combination with their silence. 
Studies confirm that groups, such as persons with low intelligence or 
mental problems, juveniles, persons whose native language is not 
English, and deaf defendants, tend not to comprehend the Miranda rights 
and do not appreciate the significance of waiving them.85  Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a suspect’s inability to 
fully comprehend his Miranda rights and give a meaningful waiver 
should render any resulting confession inadmissible.  The suspect in 
Colorado v. Connelly86 suffered from chronic schizophrenia and was in a 
psychotic state when he confessed.87  The Court rejected the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s finding that Connelly was incapable of giving a 
voluntary waiver of his rights due to his mental impairment.  The Court 
determined that the sole concern of the Fifth Amendment is 
“governmental coercion” and the “voluntariness of a waiver of this [Fifth 
Amendment] privilege has always depended on the absence of police 
overreaching.”88  It did not matter that the suspect felt compelled to 
waive his rights and confess by the “voice of God”; unless the police 
acted inappropriately in obtaining the waiver, it would be considered 
voluntary. 
The voluntariness of a waiver is also not affected by the fact that a 
suspect is unaware that an attorney has been retained to represent him 
                         
83 Id. 
84 The majority states that the agents had determined that he was literate.  Id. at 370.  
However, the dissenting opinion points out that there was a dispute in the record on this 
issue.  Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
85 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME:  THE LANGUAGE OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77–87 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2005). 
86 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
87 Id. at 161. 
88 Id. at 170. 
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and is at the police station seeking to consult with the suspect.89  Nor 
does it make a difference that the suspect is unaware of the seriousness 
of the charges for which he is being questioned.90   
In addition, Professors Leo and White have suggested that the police 
have learned to use the issuance of Miranda warnings in one of three 
ways, two of which can induce waivers.91  First, they may issue them in a 
simple, neutral way, without trying to induce a waiver in any way,92 
which is probably the method most consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
original intention.  Second, they may try to de-emphasize the 
significance of the warnings, treating them as a mere formality, as a way 
of disarming a suspect and setting the person at ease, making it easier to 
obtain a waiver.93  Finally, the police may offer suspects benefits in 
exchange for waivers.94   
In sum, the warnings need not be given with much precision and 
may even be given in a misleading way and still be considered adequate.  
In obtaining waivers, a suspect may engage in equivocal behavior, such 
as refusing to sign a waiver form, and not explicitly waive the right to 
counsel, but a court could still find that a valid waiver occurred.  Even if 
a suspect does not actually understand the rights or the significance of 
waiving them, e.g., due to mental impairment, the waiver will be 
considered voluntary unless the police act improperly.  Considering all 
of these factors, issuing warnings and obtaining waivers could not be 
easier. 
C. Increasing Suspects’ Burden to Invoke Miranda Rights 
The Court has found a valid waiver of rights in cases in which the 
facts suggest that was not the suspect’s intent, but the same has been true 
for invocations of the rights.  Even though suspects may try to invoke 
their rights—and even if the police understand that this is the suspect’s 
intent—the Court has imposed a high degree of clarity which means that 
police can ignore unclear invocations.  An officer can continue with the 
interrogation unless the invocation is clearly asserted.  Moreover, even a 
suspect who manages to speak precisely in asserting the right to silence 
will not necessarily be spared from later attempts to obtain a waiver of 
that right.  Under certain circumstances, the police can try again to get a 
                         
89 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1986). 
90 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1987). 
91 See Leo & White, supra note 22, at 431–47. 
92 Id. at 432–33. 
93 Id. at 433–39. 
94 Id. at 440–47. 
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waiver from a suspect who has affirmatively invoked his right to silence, 
although not when a suspect invokes the right to an attorney. 
If a suspect clearly invokes the right to silence, the police must 
immediately cease the interrogation.  However, the Court’s decision in 
Michigan v. Mosley95 stands for the proposition that Miranda is not 
violated if the police wait for a significant period of time, i.e., more than 
two hours, issue warnings for a second time and attempt again to obtain 
a waiver, this time to discuss a different offense.96  The Supreme Court 
held that the police had “‘scrupulously honored’” Mosley’s “‘right to cut 
off questioning.’”97   
In contrast, the Court in Edwards v. Arizona98 held that once a suspect 
has invoked the right to counsel, unless the suspect re-initiates a 
discussion of the pending charges, the police may not initiate a second 
interrogation by again issuing warnings and trying again to obtain a 
waiver until counsel has been made available to the suspect.99  The 
outcome in Edwards was predictable, given the directive in the Miranda 
opinion that clearly states that if a suspect requests an attorney “‘the 
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’”100  The rule 
requires not only that the suspect be allowed to consult with an attorney, 
but that no further interrogation may proceed without the presence of 
                         
95 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
96 Id.  In Mosley, the suspect was arrested in connection with certain robberies.  The 
detective issued Miranda warnings, whereupon Mosley invoked his right to silence.  At that 
point, the detective ceased the interrogation.  More than two hours later, a different 
detective took the suspect to a different location in the building and also issued Miranda 
warnings.  This detective questioned Mosley solely about an unrelated murder.  Id. at 104–
05.  The fact that a different detective, in a different location, and about a different crime, 
had questioned Mosley did not appear determinative. The Court distinguishes a 
companion case of Miranda, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by noting that in 
Mosley, in contrast to Westover, “the police gave full ‘Miranda warnings’ to Mosley at the 
very outset of each interrogation, subjected him to only a brief period of initial questioning, 
and suspended questioning entirely for a significant period before beginning the 
interrogation that led to his incriminating statement.”  423 U.S. at 106–07.  This was in 
contrast to “[t]he cardinal fact” of Westover, which was the failure of the police to give 
warnings at all.  Id. at 107. 
97 Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104. 
98 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
99 Id. at 484–85; see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per curiam) (following an 
unambiguous request for counsel, a suspect may not be interrogated and post-request 
responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of an initial 
request for counsel).  The rule in Edwards was extended to cases in which a suspect’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel has attached as well. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 
(1986). 
100 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)). 
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counsel.101  The Court reaffirmed this rule in a case in which the police 
had properly ceased interrogating a suspect upon his request for 
counsel, but several days later a different officer, unaware of the 
invocation of the right to counsel, initiated a second interrogation by 
issuing warnings, obtaining a waiver, and questioning the suspect on a 
separate investigation of a different crime.102  The opinion distinguished 
Mosley, noting that “a suspect’s decision to cut off questioning, unlike his 
request for counsel, does not raise the presumption that he is unable to 
proceed without a lawyer’s advice.”103 
The right to counsel protection in Edwards is severely limited by a 
decision making it much less likely that many suspects will be found to 
have actually requested counsel, even if that may be their intent.  
Namely, in Davis v. United States,104 the suspect, who had been 
interrogated for an hour and a half stated:  “‘Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer.’” 105  The agents interrogating him then paused to inquire 
whether he meant to request a lawyer to which the suspect clearly 
answered that he did not want a lawyer.106  The majority rejected a rule 
requiring police to cease interrogating to arrange for the appointment of 
counsel upon an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney.  
Unless a suspect unambiguously requests counsel, the interrogation may 
proceed uninterrupted.107  The Court would not even go so far as to 
require that the officers ask clarifying questions, as was actually done in 
the Davis case.  Oddly, the majority gave two important reasons why 
asking clarifying questions should be required:  “Clarifying questions 
help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney 
if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being 
suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the 
meaning of the suspect’s statement regarding counsel.”108  However, in 
the very next sentence the Court flatly rejected adopting such a rule.109 
                         
101 See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
102 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
103 Id. at 683. 
104 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
105 Id. at 455. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 459; see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979) (holding that the juvenile 
who requested assistance of a juvenile probation officer upon being asked whether he 
wanted to give up his right to have an attorney present did not implicitly invoke his right 
to counsel or his right to silence). 
108 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. 
109 Id. at 461–62. 
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In Davis, the Court  candidly engaged in a balancing of interests.  On 
one side of the scale is the interest in protecting the rights of suspects 
who are disadvantaged by “fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or 
a variety of other reasons” who “will not clearly articulate their right to 
counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.” 110  On 
the other side is “the need for effective law enforcement.”111  
The Court was right to recognize that certain groups would be more 
disadvantaged by this ruling than others.  Professors Solan and Tiersna 
addressed the common practice of speaking indirectly and politely (“Do 
you think I might need a lawyer?”) and hedging or “softening” a 
statement (“Maybe I need a lawyer.”).112  They discuss the findings of 
research linguists that associate this type of indirect speech style with 
“powerless” groups, such as the less educated or those of lower 
socioeconomic status.113  They show that “[i]n contrast, better-educated 
and more affluent people, who probably have a clearer understanding of 
their rights, will be inclined to assert them more directly.”114 
The rule in Davis reflects the Court’s apparent view that the interests 
of law enforcement were better served by denying the right to counsel to 
those groups of people who are disadvantaged by a rule requiring an 
unequivocal invocation.  The Court feared that a rule requiring clarifying 
questions would force police officers to make “difficult judgment calls 
about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not 
said so . . . .”115  It is curious that the Court would think that requiring 
clarifying questions would necessitate that officers make “difficult 
judgment calls” because the whole point of asking for clarification, e.g., 
“Are you saying you want a lawyer?” is that the suspect is then forced to 
answer the question more definitively.  It is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the Court opted for a regime that would allow the police 
deliberately to ignore a suspect’s attempts to invoke the Miranda rights, a 
                         
110 Id. at 460. 
111 Id. at 461. 
112 See SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 85, at 54–62. 
113 Id. at 60–61 (citing WILLIAM M. O’BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE:  LANGUAGE, POWER, 
AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM 64–71 (Academic Press 1982), and an updated 
discussion in JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS:  LAW, LANGUAGE AND 
POWER 65–66 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998)); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different 
Register:  The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993) 
(arguing that Supreme Court doctrine disadvantages people who use indirect speech 
patterns, as is typical of powerless groups, especially women). 
114 SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 85, at 60. 
115 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. 
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practice that in and of itself can increase the coercive atmosphere 
Miranda was intended to dispel. 
D. Minimizing the Consequences for Deliberately Violating Miranda 
1. A Weak Exclusionary Rule 
The final way in which the Supreme Court weakened the impact of 
Miranda was by circumscribing the reach of the exclusionary rule.  The 
first case that allows the use of statements taken in violation of Miranda 
was Harris v. New York.116  In Harris, the Court approved the use of 
statements taken in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching the 
defendant’s testimony at trial.117  The Miranda violation in this case 
stemmed from defective warnings that did not apprise the suspect of his 
right to counsel.118  This case marks the Court’s first articulation of a 
deterrence rationale for determining the scope of Miranda’s exclusionary 
rule as well as the prediction that “sufficient deterrence [of Miranda 
violations by the police] flows when the evidence in question is made 
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.”119  The prediction that 
police would be deterred sufficiently by the exclusion of Miranda-
violative statements from the government’s case in chief would become a 
central theme in the Court’s Miranda exclusionary rule cases.120  This 
deterrence rationale, by the Court’s own terms, should be limited to 
unintentional or  “good faith” violations of Miranda.121 
                         
116 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
117 Id. at 226 (“The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use 
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent 
utterances.”). 
118 Id. at 224. 
119 Id. at 225. 
120 See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975) (stating that Harris struck a balance 
between the need for evidence and the deterrence of law enforcement and that “we are not 
disposed to change it now”); see also Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351–52 (1990).  
Police violated the prophylactic rule of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), prohibiting 
police from initiating questioning of a suspect who invokes Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  The Court permitted the use of statements taken in violation of Jackson, finding 
that “the ‘search for truth in a criminal case’ outweighs the ‘speculative possibility’ that 
exclusion of evidence might deter future violations . . . .”  Id. 
121 The Court rejected the need to deter police violations of Miranda in Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).  The majority wrote:  “Where the official action was pursued in 
complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.”  Id.  In 
other words, the inverse must also be true:  Where the official action was pursued in 
complete bad faith, the deterrence rationale gains much of its force.  See also Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (“[T]he absence of any coercion or improper tactics 
undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness and deterrence—for a broader 
[exclusionary] rule.”). 
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Even more than Harris, Oregon v. Hass122 created an incentive for 
police to disregard a suspect’s invocation of the Miranda rights.123  In 
Hass, the suspect had invoked his right to counsel.  Under Edwards, 
questioning should have ceased until the suspect had been provided 
with counsel.124  Instead, the officer proceeded to take the suspect to the 
location where stolen property might be found and, presumably, asked 
the suspect to point to the place where the property was located.125  
Thus, the officer violated the clear mandate in Edwards to cease 
questioning a suspect once he has invoked his right to counsel, whereas 
in Harris the violation involved the issuance of inadvertently defective 
warnings.  Without commenting on whether the violation in Hass was 
intentional or not, the Court simply concluded:  “We see no valid 
distinction to be made in the application of the principles of Harris to that 
case and to Hass’ case. . . .  [T]here is sufficient deterrence when the 
evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in 
chief.”126  The Hass opinion concedes that under these facts “the officer 
may be said to have little to lose and perhaps something to gain by way 
of possibly uncovering impeachment material,” but, calling this a 
“speculative possibility,” concludes that the proper balance was struck in 
Harris.127  Thus, faced with what may have been an intentional violation 
of Miranda and recognizing the incentives to violate Miranda, the Court 
nonetheless found the possibility that officers will intentionally violate 
Miranda to obtain impeachment material “speculative.”128 
Two other cases further reduced the reach of the exclusionary rule—
Michigan v. Tucker129 and Oregon v. Elstad.130  In Tucker, the Court 
determined that the Miranda exclusionary rule should not apply to the 
“fruits” of Miranda violations, in this case, the name of a witness.131  In 
                         
122 420 U.S. 714 (1975). 
123 See Clymer, supra note 4, at 506. 
124 See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
125 Hass, 420 U.S. at 715–16. 
126 Id. at 722. 
127 Id. at 723. 
128 The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule was extended to situations in 
which the police initiate questioning after a suspect has invoked his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  See supra note 120 (discussing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990)).  In 
both Harvey and Hass, the Court found that it was possible for a suspect to give a voluntary 
statement for purposes of the Due Process Clause requirement, even if taken in violation of 
the Miranda rule.  See Harvey, 494 U.S. at 353; Hass, 420 U.S. at 722–23. 
129 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
130 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
131 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450–51.  The violation consisted of issuing defective warnings that 
did not apprise the suspect that counsel would be provided free of charge if he could not 
afford to hire one.  Id. at 436.  Tucker involved derivative evidence that consisted of witness 
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Elstad, the Court concluded that an initial failure to issue warnings prior 
to obtaining admissions through custodial interrogation does not 
necessarily “taint” a subsequent confession made after properly 
following the warning and waiver procedure.132  In both decisions, the 
Court explicitly stated its view that a confession obtained in violation of 
Miranda is not necessarily coerced, and thus, is not necessarily a violation 
of a person’s Fifth Amendment rights.133  The Court found that in both of 
these cases the police did not violate the suspects’ constitutional rights, 
so the decisions were based instead on a balancing of the need for 
trustworthy evidence and the need to deter improper police conduct.  An 
important aspect of both decisions was the Court’s assessment that the 
violations were committed inadvertently or in “good faith.”134  Language 
in both decisions seems to suggest that the exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule only apply in cases in which the Miranda violations are 
inadvertent.135   
However, ultimately, the admissibility of the evidence obtained 
following a Miranda violation turned not on whether the violation was 
intentional or inadvertent, but whether the resulting statements were 
voluntary or coerced so as to violate the suspect’s constitutional rights.136  
Predictably, both cases further encouraged police officers to violate 
Miranda intentionally.137  Tucker offers the use of derivative evidence that 
may be discovered by means of statements obtained by continuing to 
                                                       
testimony.  Because the Court treats witness testimony differently than other types of 
evidence such as weapons or other tangible items, Tucker should be construed narrowly.  
Witnesses will not be prevented from testifying due to a violation of Miranda, or even due 
to a Fourth Amendment violation for that matter.  See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 
268, 277 (1978) (noting that the name of a potential witness is of no evidentiary significance 
per se as compared to inanimate evidentiary objects and finding the proffer of the witness’s 
testimony to be so attenuated from the Fourth Amendment violation so as to be admissible 
under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule). 
132 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307–08. 
133 Id. at 308–09; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444–45; see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 
(1984) (referring to Miranda warnings as “‘not themselves rights protected by the 
Constitution’” and finding that suspect’s statement was not “actually compelled”). 
134 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (noting that the case did not involve coercion or improper 
tactics); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445, 447. 
135 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (“As in Tucker, the absence of any coercion or improper tactics 
undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness and deterrence—for a broader 
[exclusionary] rule.”); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 (“Where the official action was pursued in 
complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.”). 
136 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318 (“We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to 
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled . . . .”); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 
448–49 (distinguishing facts in this case from cases in which involuntary statements were 
obtained through severe pressure or third-degree torture). 
137 See infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text. 
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interrogate a suspect who has invoked his rights, just as Harris offers the 
use of those statements for impeachment.  Elstad, on the other hand, 
permitted officers to refrain from giving warnings, obtaining a 
statement, and then later following the warnings and waiver procedure 
to obtain a statement that will be admissible for all purposes including 
the government’s case in chief.138   
2. No Civil Liability for Deliberate Violations of Miranda 
Civil liability for intentional violations of constitutional rights under 
§ 1983 provides a potential deterrent against police misconduct.  
Intentional violations of Miranda might have been deterred by the threat 
of civil liability.  However, the Court rejected the claim of a suspect who 
had established that a police officer had interrogated him without 
issuing Miranda rights in Chavez v. Martinez.139  In the plurality decision 
of a badly split Court, the Chavez opinion concludes that a failure to 
follow Miranda’s warning and waiver procedure prior to custodial 
interrogation does not of itself constitute a constitutional violation, and 
thus, there is no civil liability for the omission.140  The Court interpreted 
its prior holdings as demonstrating that “mere coercion does not violate 
the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled 
statements in a criminal case against the witness.”141  Thus, a police 
officer who failed to follow the dictates of Miranda does not violate a 
constitutional rule.  The Constitution would have been violated had a 
court admitted the statements produced by the interrogation against the 
individual at trial.142  Because courts do not admit statements taken in 
                         
138 See infra notes 167–83 and accompanying text. 
139 538 U.S. 760, 764 (2003). 
140 Id. at 772.  The Court reiterated its position that the Miranda warnings are a 
prophylactic measure to safeguard against a violation of the Fifth Amendment, but the 
failure to issue Miranda warnings does not violate the Constitution.  Id.  The subsequent 
interrogation took place under conditions that may have actually coerced the incriminating 
statements.  The officer had persisted in questioning him despite his objections and even 
though he was in the midst of receiving medical treatment for injuries that left him 
permanently blind and paralyzed.  Id. at 764.  The Court remanded the case for the lower 
court to rule on the suspect’s claim of liability based on the violation of his substantive due 
process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 779–80. 
141 Id. at 769. 
142 Id. at 772–73.  Interestingly, assuming the constitutional violation does not occur until 
such time as the statement is admitted in court against the suspect, there still would be no 
civil remedy available.  Of course, most courts will exclude statements taken in violation of 
Miranda from the government’s case in chief.  However, if a court should erroneously 
admit such a statement, the court’s intervening act of admitting the statement probably 
would be considered to break the causal link between the police officer’s violation of the 
Miranda requirements and transformation of that act into a constitutional violation.  Thus, 
the police officer would not be civilly liable.  Trial judges would have absolute immunity 
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violation of Miranda in the government’s case in chief, the result is that 
no police officer will ever face civil liability for intentionally violating 
Miranda. 
In sum, the Court’s decisions over the years, with the exception of 
the Edwards decision, which was clearly dictated by the language of the 
Miranda opinion itself, every other case can be counted as a victory for 
the government.143  Even the landmark case of Dickerson v. United 
States,144 reaffirming the constitutional basis for the Miranda rule, can be 
considered a win for the government.  By the time Dickerson was 
decided, Miranda had become a minimal obstacle to obtaining 
confessions,145 and more often than not, it served to protect confessions 
from claims of involuntariness.146  
III.  SEIBERT AND PATANE FAIL TO HALT THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
“GOING OUTSIDE” MIRANDA 
The Supreme Court has had documentation of the practice of 
flagrantly violating or “going outside” Miranda as well as abundant 
evidence of the institutionalization of this practice for some time.  In the 
recent cases of Missouri v. Seibert147 and United States v. Patane,148 the 
Court failed to make a clear statement denouncing the practice of 
intentionally evading Miranda’s protocols.  The combined effect of the 
decisions is to legitimize the practice of “going outside” Miranda when 
the police perceive the benefits of doing so to outweigh the costs.  In 
short, Miranda is effectively dead, and only its ghost remains in the 
empty ritual played out in interrogation rooms across the country. 
                                                       
for what they do in their judicial capacity.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).  In 
the end, no one is civilly liable for a Miranda violation. 
143 See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.  Some might also consider Doyle v. 
Ohio a victory for suspects invoking their rights under Miranda.  See Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000) (stating that the Court has broadened the application of the 
Miranda doctrine in Doyle).  However, the Doyle decision found a Fifth Amendment 
violation in the government’s inducement of a person’s silence by the reading of Miranda 
warnings and then using that silence against a person at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 
617 (1976).  It was not a case involving a violation of the warnings and waiver protocol 
itself.  See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
144 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
145 See id. at 443. (“If anything, our subsequent cases [interpreting Miranda] have reduced 
the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the 
decision’s core ruling . . . .”). 
146 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
147 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
148 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
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The following section addresses the jurisprudential shift that allows 
the Court to proclaim that Miranda is a constitutionally based rule while 
at the same time treating a violation of Miranda as something less than 
the violation of a constitutional right.  The subsequent sections 
demonstrate how the Court has finally killed Miranda, first by failing to 
provide an effective remedy for intentional violations and then by 
refusing to eliminate the incentives to violate Miranda.  
A.   Encouraging the Practice of “Going Outside” Miranda 
The cumulative effect of the Court’s jurisprudence has been to free 
interrogators to obey or disobey Miranda’s strictures depending on the 
balance of advantages and disadvantages.149  In some cases, following 
the letter of the Miranda rule may make it easier to produce an 
admissible confession.  In others, it may be perceived as advantageous to 
disregard the dictates of Miranda, even if doing so will render a possible 
confession inadmissible in the government’s case in chief.  Have some 
police departments made a practice of “going outside” Miranda when 
doing so is advantageous?  Clearly, the answer is yes. 
Exact numbers are not available, but evidence suggests the practice 
has been spreading.  Charles Weisselberg’s 1998 article cites police 
training manuals from California that promoted this “new vision of 
Miranda” and encouraged officers to ignore invocations of Miranda.150  
He notes that these training manuals were distributed statewide and that 
deliberate violations of Miranda were reported in counties all across the 
state.151  In addition, he finds evidence of deliberate violations of Miranda 
in at least two other states, Colorado and Arizona, as well as the District 
of Columbia.152  The Seibert case, a Missouri case, brings the count to four 
states and the District of Columbia.  More importantly, the Court in 
Seibert cites a national police-training program that had instructed 
officers of the advantages of intentionally failing to issue the Miranda 
warnings in some situations.153  The Court also cites cases from four 
federal Courts of Appeal in which the officers did not issue Miranda 
                         
149 Clymer assesses the advantages and disadvantages of giving as well as withholding 
Miranda warnings, and of honoring as well as ignoring requests to terminate questioning.  
See Clymer, supra note 4, at 512–25. 
150 Weisselberg, supra note †, at 132–37. 
151 Id. at 136.  He also reports that “two LAPD interrogation forms even have a box for 
officers to check if they questioned ‘outside Miranda.’”  Id. at 137; see also Clymer, supra note 
4, at 523–25 (addressing practice of going outside Miranda); Leo & White, supra note 21, at 
460–63 (describing strategies employed by interrogators questioning “outside Miranda”). 
152 Weisselberg, supra note †, at 137–38. 
153 See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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warnings before obtaining incriminating statements followed by the 
issuance of warnings and the making of a second statement.154  The next 
section discusses the issue raised in Seibert and the Court’s plurality 
decision. 
B. Seibert:  The Court Fails to Denounce Intentional Violations 
Missouri v. Seibert represents the first time the Supreme Court has 
considered an admittedly intentional violation of Miranda.  It is also the 
first acknowledgment that police departments have received training 
that promotes the practice of violating the dictates of Miranda in certain 
situations.  The first sentence of the judgment of the Court, penned by 
Justice Souter, describes the case as testing “a police protocol.”155  The 
protocol, which he dubs the “question first” approach, “calls for giving 
no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until interrogation has 
produced a confession.”156  This first statement would clearly be 
inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Miranda.  However, the 
question-first approach calls on the officer to follow up the first 
confession with the issuance of Miranda warnings and then elicit the 
same confession from the suspect a second time.  The Seibert case 
addressed the admissibility of this second statement.  While the “test” 
proposed in the judgment for the Court would have curtailed the 
“question first” practice, the actual holding of the case is the position 
taken by Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment on the 
narrowest grounds,157 and that rule does little to curb the practice. 
The facts of the Seibert case are appalling.  As reported by the Court: 
Patrice Seibert’s 12-year-old son Jonathan had cerebral 
palsy, and when he died in his sleep she feared charges 
of neglect because of bedsores on his body.  In her 
presence, two of her teenage sons and two of their 
friends devised a plan to conceal the facts surrounding 
Jonathan’s death by incinerating his body in the course 
                         
154 The Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the four circuit courts of appeal.  
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (citing United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030 
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Gale, 
952 F.2d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
155 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604. 
156 Id. at 601. 
157 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976) (“When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
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of burning the family’s mobile home, in which they 
planned to leave Donald Rector, a mentally ill teenager 
living with the family, to avoid the appearance that 
Jonathan had been unattended.  Seibert’s son Darian and 
a friend set the fire, and Donald died.158 
The investigation apparently turned to Seibert within a few days.  At 
3 a.m., five days after the fire, police officers awakened Seibert at the 
hospital where her son, Darian, was receiving treatment, and arrested 
her.  The arresting officer, Officer Kevin Clinton, stated that he had 
followed the instructions of another officer, Officer Richard Hanrahan, to 
refrain from issuing Miranda warnings.159  Upon arriving at the police 
station, Seibert was left alone in an interview room for fifteen to twenty 
minutes.  Thereafter, Officer Hanrahan questioned her for thirty to forty 
minutes without first issuing Miranda warnings.  At one point, he 
squeezed her arm and repeated, “‘Donald was also to die in his 
sleep.’”160  Seibert finally admitted that she knew Donald was meant to 
die in the fire by answering simply, “yes.”  She was then given a twenty-
minute coffee and cigarette break.  Following the break, Officer 
Hanrahan turned on a tape recorder, gave Seibert the Miranda warnings 
for the first time, and obtained a signed waiver of rights from her.  He 
resumed the questioning:  “‘Ok, ‘trice, we’ve been talking for a little 
while about what happened on Wednesday the twelfth, haven’t we?’”  
Then he confronted her with her earlier statements taken before the 
issuance of warnings.161  By reminding her of her earlier statement, he 
was able to get her to agree that they had intended Donald to die in his 
sleep. 
At a suppression hearing, Officer Hanrahan candidly testified that 
he made a “conscious decision” to withhold Miranda warnings as part of 
the question-first “interrogation technique” that he had been taught.162  
He also stated that the technique was promoted not only by the officer’s 
department in Rolla, Missouri, but by a national police training 
organization and other departments in which he had worked.163  The 
Court also cited written statements by the Police Law Institute, 
published in the Illinois Police Law Manual, endorsing the question-first 
tactic and noted similar statements from police law manuals in New 
                         
158 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 605. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 605–06. 
163 Id. at 609. 
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York and California as well as a police law treatise.164  However, the 
Court acknowledged that not all law enforcement educators advocated 
the violation of Miranda’s protocol.165 
The trial court suppressed the first incriminating statement as taken 
in violation of Miranda but admitted the second disputed statement in 
which Seibert again admitted her role in killing Donald.  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri reversed.  Notably, the court held that the second 
confession was involuntary because the interrogation tactic was 
“intended to deprive Seibert of the opportunity to knowingly and 
intelligently waive her Miranda rights” in that “[b]oth stages of the 
interview formed a nearly continuous interrogation . . . .”166  The state 
high court also distinguished Oregon v. Elstad,167 upholding the 
admission of a second, warned statement following a first, unwarned 
statement, on the basis that Elstad involved an unintentional Miranda 
violation, unlike the intentional violation in this case.168  The Court 
granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Courts of Appeal on this 
issue.169   
1. Elstad and Bayer:  Of “Cats in Bags” and “Fruits of Poisonous Trees”  
The Seibert decision relies heavily on two prior cases that had 
presented variants of the question-first issue.  In Oregon v. Elstad, the 
initial failure to issue Miranda warnings was not intentional. In United 
States v. Bayer,170 which pre-dates Miranda, the initial confession was 
actually coerced while the second was given several months later under 
favorable conditions.171  Both decisions called upon the Court to address 
the reach of exclusionary rules—Miranda’s exclusionary rule in Elstad 
and the Fourteenth Amendment due process exclusionary rule for 
involuntary confessions in Bayer. 
In Elstad, the officers went to the home of a teenage suspect to 
execute an arrest warrant for him.  Not realizing that questioning a 
suspect in his home would constitute “custody” for Miranda purposes, 
they interviewed him in his living room, and after asking his mother to 
step into the kitchen and without issuing Miranda warnings, they 
                         
164 Id. at 611 n.2. 
165 Id. 
166 State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 706 (2002). 
167 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
168 Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 706. 
169 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 607. 
170 331 U.S. 532 (1947). 
171 Id. at 535. 
Thompson: Evading Miranda:  How Seibert and Patane Failed To "Save" Miranda
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
674 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
obtained a confession.  They then drove him to the police station.  One 
hour later, they issued Miranda warnings and obtained a second 
confession.172 
The Supreme Court held that the second confession was properly 
admitted and did not violate the rule in Miranda.173  The Court rejected 
the application of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, explaining 
that its application would assume that, in violating the Miranda rule, 
there has been a constitutional violation.174  The Court characterized the 
omission of warnings in the first instance as “technically in violation of 
Miranda,”175 meaning that it was an “uncoercive” Miranda violation.176  
The majority explained that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of 
compelled testimony only, namely, involuntary statements or those not 
taken in compliance with Miranda.   
The Miranda presumption of compulsion does not require, however, 
that the fruits of such violations be discarded as inherently tainted.177  
Because the unwarned statement did not actually infringe on his 
constitutional rights, there are no “fruits” to suppress in any case.178  The 
Court reasoned that suppression would disable the police from 
obtaining confessions, even when there is no coercion. 
In Elstad, the Court also downplayed the significance of a suspect’s 
letting “the cat out of the bag” during the initial interrogation.  The 
Court considered the psychological impact of the first confession to be 
irrelevant if no official coercion was used.  The majority also questioned 
whether the initial disclosure has any psychological effect at all, stating 
that “the causal connection between any psychological disadvantage 
created by his [initial] admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate 
is speculative and attenuated at best.”179  Therefore, the Court ruled that 
there should be no exclusion of the second statement unless it was 
determined to have been given involuntarily.180 
The Elstad decision cites the Court’s pre-Miranda decision in Bayer for 
the proposition that even if one confesses after letting the “cat out of the 
                         
172 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301. 
173 Id. at 317–18. 
174 Id. at 305–06. 
175 Id. at 318. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 307. 
178 Id. at 308 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)). 
179 Id. at 313–14. 
180 Id. at 318. 
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bag,” a second confession may still be admissible if the taint of the earlier 
confession has been removed.181  In Bayer, the Court addressed a 
situation in which a presumably involuntary confession was obtained 
first,182 followed by a six-month lapse after which the suspect made an 
essentially identical second confession.  This time the defendant’s liberty 
was not severely limited, and he was given “fair warning” prior to being 
questioned.183 
In Bayer, the Court articulated the “cat out of the bag” theory in 
which an initial involuntary confession can create psychological 
pressures on an accused to give a second confession, even if the second 
interrogation occurs in a non-coercive atmosphere: 
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the 
bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is 
never thereafter free of the psychological and practical 
disadvantages of having confessed.  He can never get 
the cat back in the bag.  The secret is out for good.  In 
such a sense, a later confession always may be looked 
upon as fruit of the first.184   
The Court did not lay down a rule automatically excluding a second 
confession that is the “fruit” of an earlier involuntary confession.  As the 
Elstad majority notes, the Bayer decision states:  “But this Court has never 
gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances 
                         
181 Id. at 311 (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1947)). 
182 According to the decision: 
After service of distinction in Burma, Radovich then 24 years of age, 
was ordered to report to Mitchel Field.  Upon arrival on August 9, 
1944, he was placed under arrest and confined in the psychopathic 
ward in the station hospital.  Here, for some time, he was denied 
callers, communication, comforts and facilities which it is needless to 
detail.  Charges for court-martial were not promptly served on him as 
said to be required by the 70th Article of War . . . nor was he taken 
before a magistrate for arraignment on any charges preferred by civil 
authorities.  Military charges were finally served on May 30, 1945. 
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 539. 
183 Id. at 541. 
184 Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540.  The Court also endorsed the “cat-out-of-the-bag” approach in 
Brown v. Illinois as well, although the illegal act in this case violated the Fourth 
Amendment, not Miranda.  In Brown, the suspect had been illegally arrested and then had 
given incriminating statements on two occasions.  The Court held that the first statements 
were clearly admissible as a product of the illegal arrest.  Id. at 604.  The second statement 
was also ruled inadmissible as a “result and the fruit of the first.”  Id. at 605.  It was 
significant that “Brown’s first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than 
two hours, and there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever.”  See Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975). 
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which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a 
usable one after those conditions have been removed.”185  However, 
what the Elstad decision fails to mention is that Bayer does not simply 
admit a second confession upon proof that it was voluntarily given.  
Rather, Bayer provides that the “cat out of the bag” scenario creates a 
presumption that an involuntary confession taints the later confession, 
thus placing on the government the burden of showing that the taint of 
the first interrogation has dissipated.186  This may be proved by 
considering the passage of time, the nature of the restraint on the 
suspect’s liberty, whether the suspect was warned of the consequences of 
confessing, and other relevant factors.187  If the taint has in fact been 
removed, then the second confession is considered voluntary and may 
be admitted, which is what the Court actually decided in Bayer.   
This rule is a far cry from the rule in Elstad that requires the 
defendant to bear the burden of proving that the second confession was 
involuntarily given.  For one thing, the Supreme Court minimized the 
psychological disadvantage of having made an initial unwarned 
confession as “speculative and attenuated at best.”188  Thus, lower courts 
are, in effect, instructed not to put much weight on this factor.  In 
contrast, the Court signaled to the lower courts that they should consider 
it highly probative “that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed 
of his rights.”189   
In neither Bayer nor Elstad did the inquiry turn on whether the 
officers had acted in good or bad faith in eliciting the first confession 
improperly and then eliciting a later second confession following the 
proper procedures.  It is fair to say that the Court in Bayer suspected that 
the initial confession was intentionally coerced from the suspect, while 
the police omission in Elstad was most likely considered a good-faith 
                         
185 Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540–41 (quoted in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985)). 
186 The Bayer opinion does not actually speak to the issue of burdens of proof.  However, 
the Court has subsequently made clear that the government should bear the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of an illegally obtained 
confession would inevitably have been discovered.  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
n.5 (1984).  This is the same burden of proof applied in suppression hearings to determine 
the admissibility of evidence derived from violations of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
187 In Bayer, the Court took into account the fact that the second confession was given six 
months after the first, that the only restraint on the suspect’s freedom was that he could not 
leave the military base without permission, and that he was given “fair warning” prior to 
the second interrogation.  331 U.S. at 541. 
188 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 313–14. 
189 Id. at 318. 
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mistake.190  The Seibert case squarely presented the question of a bad-
faith failure to follow Miranda. 
2. Seibert Charts a New Course for Intentional Evasions of Miranda  
The Seibert and Patane cases reflect deep divisions among the 
members of the Court.  Only four Justices are represented in the opinioin 
delivering the judgment of the Court in Seibert.  Justice Souter, who 
authored the opinion, was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer.  The concurring opinion, issued by Justice Kennedy, announced 
a narrower rule than that of Justice Souter’s opinion.  Thus, Justice 
Kennedy’s rule becomes the applicable standard.  The differences 
between the two opinions are striking.   
The first line of Justice Souter’s opinion frames the question as 
testing “a police protocol,” recognizing the institutionalization of the 
question-first tactic for evading Miranda.  He also acknowledged that 
training programs have encouraged officers to ignore invocations of the 
Miranda rights in order to reap the benefits of the impeachment 
exception of Harris.191  It is thus not surprising that the plurality opinion, 
while professing to abide by the rule in Elstad, comes closer to applying a 
rule like that in Bayer.  As in both Elstad and Bayer, Justice Souter would 
allow for the possibility that a second, Mirandized statement could be 
admissible.  Elstad cleared the second statement for admission if it met 
the standards for “voluntariness,” whereas Bayer required also that the 
“taint” of letting the cat out of the bag had dissipated, in that case by the 
passage of time and the provision of more favorable conditions.192  The 
plurality set forth an objective rule that turns simply on “whether it 
would be reasonable to find that in [a question first, warn later situation] 
the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.”193  This 
rule resembles that in Bayer, in that the determination of effectiveness of 
the warnings in the Seibert plurality is determined by examining the 
same types of factors as the determination of whether the taint has 
dissipated in Bayer.  Justice Souter listed the following factors to 
                         
190 In Bayer, the Court notes that the military officials failed to permit the suspect to 
communicate with the outside world and denied him “comforts” and “facilities.”  
Moreover, they failed to follow their own procedures for charging and arraigning a person.  
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 539. Thus, one can fairly conclude that the maltreatment of the suspect 
was intended to coerce a confession.  On the other hand, “it is fair to read Elstad as treating 
the living room conversation as a good-faith Miranda mistake.”  Missouri v. Seibert, 542 
U.S. 600, 615 (2004). 
191 542 U.S. at 611; see also supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 173–78, 187–88 and accompanying text. 
193 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611–12. 
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determine the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings preceding the 
second interrogation:   
[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and 
answers in the first round of interrogation, the 
overlapping content of the two statements, the timing 
and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of 
police personnel, and the degree to which the 
interrogator’s questions treated the second round as 
continuous with the first.194 
Similarly, in Bayer, the Court took into account the passage of time 
between the first and second interrogations and the fact that the suspect 
had been warned about the consequences of confessing to determine that 
the taint of the first confession had dissipated.195   
Thus, while claiming to abide by Elstad’s refusal to apply a “tainted 
fruits” approach to second, Mirandized confessions, the plurality opted 
for an objective test that appears to call for a determination of the 
connectedness of the two interrogations, a test remarkably similar to a 
“taint” test under Bayer.  The opinion might be consistent with Elstad if it 
applied only to intentional violations of Miranda, whereas the violation 
in Elstad was clearly inadvertent; however, Justice Souter explicitly 
rejects a test that turns on the intent of the officer.196  
Applying the plurality’s objective rule to the facts in Seibert, Justice 
Souter gave both an institutional and an individual reason in finding 
Seibert’s second confession inadmissible.  Exclusion of the statement 
serves the institutional purpose of furthering the objectives of Miranda 
“[b]ecause the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart 
Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would 
be admitted.”197  Moreover, exclusion of the statement is warranted 
“because the facts here do not reasonably support a conclusion that the 
warnings given could have served their purpose.”198  
                         
194 Id. at 615. 
195 See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text. 
196 The plurality rejects a test that turns on proof of the intent of the officer:  “Because the 
intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here . . .  the focus is on 
facts apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at work.”  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 
n.6. 
197 Id. at 617. 
198 Id. 
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In contrast to the judgment of the Court, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion set forth a narrower rule that limits the application of 
the plurality’s test for “Miranda effectiveness” to cases in which the 
initial failure to issue warnings is deliberate.199  By virtue of providing 
narrower grounds for exclusion of the evidence, his opinion now 
provides the new rule in constitutional adjudication of such claims.  The 
plurality eschewed a subjective intent rule on the grounds that the 
inquiry should turn instead on the effect of the police conduct on the 
suspect.200  At least one commentator called the test a “terrible idea” and 
argued that the test will be impossible for defendants to prove in most 
cases.201  Applying a “bad faith” test to question-first situations may not 
even curb training programs from instructing officers to employ the 
“deliberate, two-step strategy,” as Justice Kennedy calls it.202  As officers 
cannot be sued even for intentionally failing to follow the Miranda 
warnings and waiver protocols, training programs can be expected to 
continue to apprise officers of the costs and benefits of issuing warnings 
before questioning.   
Justice Kennedy’s rule also does more than simply limit the “Miranda 
effectiveness” test to intentional question-first cases, it also provides for 
additional avenues to admit statements taken in violation of this 
narrower rule.  He provides an exception to the narrowly constrained 
exclusionary rule for situations in which officers take “[c]urative 
measures” to render the warnings effective.203  In contrast to the 
plurality’s rule that considers a number of factors relating to the 
connectedness of the two questioning sessions and the statements 
given,204 Justice Kennedy considers a “substantial break in time and 
                         
199 Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer also issued a concurring opinion in 
which he agrees with this part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion.  He would apply a “fruits” test 
to intentional violations and create an exception for “good faith” violations.  Id. at 617–18 
(Breyer, J., concurring).  He would also apply the fruits doctrine to physical evidence.  Id.  
Thus, there are actually two Justices who subscribe to rules turning on the subjective intent 
of the officers. 
200 See supra note 196. 
201 Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?:  Why the New Missouri v. Seibert “Bad 
Faith” Police Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 410–16 (2005) (arguing that the bad 
faith test is irrelevant, impossible to prove, and contrary to Supreme Court precedent). 
202 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
203 Id. at 622. 
204 The Court lists:  “[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the 
first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and 
setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to 
which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.”  
Id. at 615 (majority opinion). 
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circumstances,” presumably without more, to “suffice in most cases” as a 
curative measure.  
He also approved the totally new curative measure of having the 
officer issue “an additional warning that explains the likely 
inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement.”205  Given the 
apparent ineffectiveness of the original, simple Miranda warnings, even 
when properly issued,206 it is hard to imagine how Justice Kennedy’s 
highly technical and legalistic warning about the inadmissibility of an 
earlier statement but admissibility of any subsequent statements will be 
effective; the utter confusion of suspects is more likely.207  As it turns out, 
such curative warnings are not to be found in subsequent case law.  
Instead, cases decided after Seibert confirm that Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion has resulted in almost all statements that are 
produced by “two-step” interrogations being admitted based on a 
variety of factors leading courts to distinguish Seibert and find the cases 
more like Elstad.208 
                         
205 Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
206 See supra Part II. 
207 Interestingly, the plurality opinion might be read to view an additional warning as 
appropriate, but it also seems to recognize the confusion inherent in mid-course issuance of 
warnings during a question-first interrogation process.  See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613 
(“[T]elling a suspect that ‘anything you say can and will be used against you,’ without 
expressly excepting the statement just given, could lead to an entirely reasonable inference 
that what he has just said will be used, with subsequent silence being of no avail.”). 
208 The Courts find Seibert inapplicable if some of the following factors apply:  there is a 
break in time between the two interrogations, a change in location, a change in 
interrogating officers, a lack of continuity between the first and second statements, a lack of 
evidence of intent to undermine Miranda, or if the initial questioning was brief.  For a 
representative sampling of the numerous decisions applying Seibert, see United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138-39 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that officers did not 
question defendant because they merely recited the evidence against him, and concluding 
that “it remained objectively reasonable for him to make [subsequent] incriminating 
statements”); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that subsequent 
questioning was not part of deliberate choice to flout Miranda); United States v. Fellers, 397 
U.S. 1090, 1097–98 (8th Cir. 2005) (assessing a situation concerning a one-hour break, 
change in location, no use of first statement during second questioning, and a brief first 
conversation); United States v. Briones, 390 U.S. 610, 614 n.3 (8th Cir. 2004) (addressing 
questioning with more than one-day break, different settings, officers represented different 
agencies, and no significant overlap or continuity); United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 
384 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2004) (considering questioning with a five-day break, different 
officer, not continuous questioning, and an unintentional first confession); and United States 
v. Yamba, 407 F. Supp. 2d 703, 718 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (finding that subsequent questioning was 
not a deliberate attempt to circumvent Miranda).  A small minority of cases with facts 
remarkably like those in Seibert find Seibert to require exclusion of a second statement.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Renker, No. 
02CR 1099, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17107 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2004). 
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Justice O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion in Elstad, wrote 
the dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas joined.  She took issue with the plurality’s treatment 
of Elstad, accusing it of “disfigure[ing]” it by essentially adopting a 
“‘fruits’ analysis.”209  She reiterated the oft-stated view that “there is 
simply is no place for a robust deterrence doctrine with regard to 
violations of Miranda v. Arizona,” and thus there is no need to exclude the 
“fruits” of a Miranda violation.210  She restated the rule in Elstad that 
would admit a second, warned confession so long as it was voluntary.211  
However, she agreed with the plurality in rejecting an intent-based 
test.212 
Thus, the plurality decision initially gives the impression that the 
Supreme Court has taken a more stringent approach in evaluating tactics 
that threaten to drain the substance out of Miranda, but the actual rule of 
the case authored by Justice Kennedy will probably not diminish 
“question-first” practices in the long run.  Proving an officer’s subjective 
intent can be nearly impossible if the officer professes not to have acted 
deliberately in violating Miranda.  Training programs will most likely 
continue to stress the costs and benefits of violating Miranda 
intentionally.  However, now the training will also include explanations 
about the “[c]urative measures” that must be taken if an officer engages 
in the deliberate “question-first” tactic during an interrogation.  It will be 
a simple matter to teach officers that they should wait a substantial 
amount of time before proceeding to issue warnings and obtain a second 
confession, or the officers should issue the new additional warning about 
the legal consequences of having previously confessed.  In short, Seibert 
does very little, if anything, to curb the practice that threatens to 
completely undermine Miranda’s safeguards. 
C. Patane:  Physical Fruits of Miranda Violations Still Admissible 
United States v. Patane presented the issue of whether the Fifth 
Amendment requires the exclusion at trial of the physical fruits of a 
Miranda violation.  The issue would not have been a novel one prior to 
Dickerson.213  However, after Dickerson the Tenth Circuit took the position 
that Dickerson instructed courts to treat Miranda as a constitutional rule, 
                         
209 Id. at 622–24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
210 Id. at 623. 
211 Id. at 627–28. 
212 Id. at 625. 
213 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that Miranda is a constitutional rule and may not be 
overruled by Congress, and refusing to overrule it). 
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and thus the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine should apply.  Other 
courts of appeal disagreed, applying Elstad and Tucker as usual.214 
Unlike the facts in the Seibert case, the facts in Patane did not involve 
a deliberate violation of Miranda.215  In Patane, the arresting officers took 
Patane into custody at a residence and attempted to advise him of his 
Miranda rights.  Patane interrupted the detective, asserting that he 
already knew his rights.  Neither of the two officers attempted to 
complete the warning prior to asking him questions about a gun.216  
Thus, the facts presented did not give the Court the opportunity to 
consider a situation in which an officer’s deliberate violation of the 
Miranda protocols might produce physical evidence.   
Another plurality decision maintains the status quo prior to 
Dickinson, with five Justices agreeing that the exclusionary rule should 
not be extended to reach nontestimonial physical fruits.217  In reaching 
this outcome, the lineups of Justices are inverted.  Justice Thomas was 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in announcing the 
judgment of the Court and reiterating their views that even an 
intentional failure to issue Miranda warnings does not violate the 
Constitution; thus, there is “nothing to deter.”218  However, this time 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, sided with the Seibert 
dissenters in concurring with the plurality.  Justice Kennedy took the 
view in Patane that the “[a]dmission of nontestimonial physical fruits 
. . . even more so than the postwarning statements to the police in Elstad 
and Michigan v. Tucker, does not run the risk of admitting into trial an 
accused’s coerced incriminating statements against himself.”219  
Moreover, he concluded that, on balance, “the important probative value 
of reliable physical evidence” outweighs the benefits of a “deterrence 
rationale sensitive to both law enforcement interests and a suspect’s 
rights during an in-custody interrogation.”220  Apparently, the fact that 
physical evidence discovered by means of statements taken in violation 
of Miranda appeared to be so attenuated to Justice Kennedy that he 
would admit the evidence without concern about encouraging future 
deliberate violations.  His lack of concern about deliberate violations in 
this case seems somewhat inconsistent with his position in Seibert in 
                         
214 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634–38 (2004). 
215 Id. at 635. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
218 Id. at 642. 
219 Id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
220 Id. 
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which he concurred in the decision to exclude the post-warning 
statement because it was part of a “deliberate, two-step strategy.”221 
The plurality members in Seibert, Justices Souter, Breyer, Stevens, 
and Ginsburg, wrote dissenting opinions in Patane.  The dissenters 
accused the plurality of “closing their eyes to the consequences of giving 
an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda” and “add[ing] 
an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that 
case.”222  The dissenters lamented that Patane creates an incentive for 
police to violate Miranda, which they believe is “an odd one, coming 
from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert.”223  In fact, 
although the Justices are split on their views on Miranda, in the end, a 
majority of them concluded that even intentional “violations” of the rule 
in Miranda should rarely, if ever, result in the exclusion of anything more 
than the statements directly obtained by that violation.  The Court’s 
subsequent decision in Wisconsin v. Knapp224 made it clear that Patane 
should be read to approve the admissibility of physical fruits of 
intentional Miranda violations. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Seibert and Patane have finally done it:  Even deliberate violations of 
Miranda can yield admissible statements and admissible physical fruits 
of such statements due to the question-first strategy and the approved 
curative measures.  Thus, there is truly nothing left of Miranda.  After the 
Chavez case, police officers understood that they need not fear being sued 
for intentional violations of Miranda.  Now it is also clear that they need 
not fear losing evidence because of their failures to issue warnings prior 
to interrogation.  Miranda is a rule of no consequence.   
At the same time as these unfortunate developments in Miranda 
jurisprudence, evidence of the dangers of coercive interrogation tactics, 
especially when used against minors, the mentally retarded, or other 
vulnerable people, continues to grow.225  Scholars and policy makers are 
increasingly calling for alternative measures to counteract the coercive 
                         
221 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
222 Patane, 542 U.S. at 646 (Souter, J., dissenting).  They conclude on a similar note:  
“There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement 
officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained.”  Id. at 647. 
223 Id. 
224 542 U.S. 952 (2004) (considering a case in which Wisconsin Supreme Court excluded 
physical evidence that was a result of a clearly intentional violation of Miranda, and 
vacating and remanding the lower court’s decision for reconsideration in light of Patane). 
225 See supra note 27. 
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forces at work during custodial interrogations.  Videotaping 
interrogations is lauded by some as an effective alternative measure,226 
but other alternatives should also be considered.  It is time for the next 
chapter in the history of our regulation of custodial interrogations to be 
written.  The Miranda chapter has effectively come to a close. 
                         
226 See WHITE, supra note 27, at 190–95 (making the reliability argument for taping); 
Innocence Project, supra note 27 (noting that taping is required by law in Alaska, 
Minnesota, and the United Kingdom; calling for videotaping throughout the United States; 
and providing a link to the report of Illinois “Governor Ryan’s Death Penalty 
Commission,” which concludes that videotaping is good law enforcement policy); Moreno, 
supra note 202, at 417–18 (arguing that videotaping will be more important to counteract 
effects of Seibert’s bad faith test); Slobogin, supra note 4 (making policy and legal arguments 
for taping).  But see Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant, 10 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 496 (1998) (arguing that taping is has practical limitations that 
militate against it as a foolproof alternative). 
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